Abstract: Two novel mutual authentication and key exchange protocols with anonymity are proposed for different roaming scenarios in the global mobility network (GLOMONET). The proposed protocols have new features, such as identity anonymity and one-time session key progression. Identity anonymity protects mobile users' privacy in the roaming network environment. One-time session key progression frequently renews the session key for mobile users and reduces the risk of using a compromised session key to communicate with visited networks. It is shown that the computation complexity of the proposed protocols is similar to the existing one appeared in the literature, while the security has been significantly enhanced.
Introduction
Global mobility network (GLOMONET) [1] , such as GSM and CDMA etc., increases the possibility of illegal access from a malicious intruder while offering more effective global roaming service for a legitimate user between the home network and the visited network. Several authentication protocols for global roaming service have been developed in the GLOMONET [2] . Suzuki et al developed an authentication protocol for roaming service [1] . They introduced a challenge/response interactive authentication mechanism with a symmetric cryptosystem to construct their authentication protocol. Buttyan et al pointed out some potential attacks to the authentication protocol in [1] , and further proposed an improved protocol and made it resistant against the presented attacks [3] . Subsequently, Hwang et al [4] introduced a new self-encryption mechanism to simplify the protocol in [3] .
However, in [4] , the long-term key shared between home network H and user M is calculated as , where f is assumed to be a secret one-way function. The protocol cannot provide identity anonymity, and an intruder can easily obtain by intercepting the messages. If the function f is spied, the intruder can compute corresponding of each user, which comprises the whole cryptographical infrastructure and then the advantage of self-encryption would be counteracted. The disclosure of a user identity will allow unauthorized entities to track his moving history and current location. Any illegal access to information related to the user location without his notice can be a serious violation of his privacy. Hence, the identity anonymity is one important property that should be considered for roaming services. The proposed authentication protocols use the temporary identity (TID) for a mobile user instead of his real one. TID is prearranged and distributed by the home network H in advance or generated by encrypting the real identity.
A secure protocol design for roaming services requires, (1) Mutual authentication between a network entity and a mobile user; (2) Mutual agreement of shared session key; (3) Assuring the freshness of session key; (4) Mutual implicit key authentication [5] . Since the protocols are implemented on the mobile device used in wireless environment, there are other two factors to be considered. Firstly, the low computational power of mobile devices should be a concern, which means a security protocol requiring heavy computation on the mobile is not feasible [6, 7] . Secondly, since the bandwidth is lower and the channel error is higher in wireless networks than that in wired networks, the security protocols should be designed to minimize the message size and the number of message exchanges.
In this paper, aiming at providing the identity anonymity and simplifying the existing authentication protocol for secure roaming service in GLOMONET environment, we propose two sets of mutual authentication and key exchange protocols with anonymity property for roaming service. The first proposed protocol uses the secretsplitting principle. The other uses self-certified scheme [8, 9] , known as a public key authentication cryptosystem. The two protocols can be deployed depending on whether the home network has setup a long-term secret key with its users. The mutual authentication with anonymity property prevents the disclosure of mobile users' real identities and protects their privacy in the roaming network environment. The key exchange renews a mobile user's session key for each session, and therefore, reduces the risk of using a compromised session key to communicate with visited networks. Although with enhanced security features, the proposed protocols require similar computation power as the existing protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, two new authentication and key exchange protocols with anonymity for secure roaming service are proposed respectively. In Section 4, the performance comparisons between the protocol in [4] and the proposed two protocols are presented in detail, followed by conclusions in Section 5.
Protocol I for Secure Roaming Services
The proposed protocol I for secure roaming service is based on the secret splitting principle [10] . The protocol includes two phases. In phase I, the visited network V authenticates a roaming user M through his home network H. After certification, an authentication key is established between M and V. In the subsequent communications, V can directly authenticate M by using the authentication key rather than authenticating it through H. In phase II, user M establishes a session key with V. Then, M can directly visit V and V can provide services for M. A novel mechanism, called "one-time session key progression", assures the mutual authentication and the freshness of session key. The proposed protocol uses symmetric encrypt algorithm and can be applied when visited network and home network have pre-setup shared secret.
Phase I: Mutual Authentication with Anonymity Property
Let H generate an m-bits random number N and keep it secretly. Note that in order to prevent the exclusive search attack, m should be sufficiently large, e.g., 256 bits. When user M registers with his home network H, he submits his identity ID M to H. Then, H computes a pseudonym identity PID M for user M as follows:
where " " denotes bitwise XOR operation, and h is a public strong one-way hash function. Subsequently, H delivers PID M to M through a secure channel, e.g., H can issue a smart card for user M. By this simple secret-splitting mechanism, the real identity ID M can be concealed in PID M and identity anonymity for M can be provided without increasing the algorithm complexity.
⊕
The detailed steps of the proposed mutual authentication protocol for the roaming services (Phase I) is described in Fig. 1 . A simple secret splitting mechanism is introduced to provide the identity anonymity and prevent unauthorized entities from tracing the mobile user's roaming history and his current location (Step 3). The authentication key is computed with the random numbers chosen by M and V by .
The mechanism makes the protocol fairer and more secure without increasing the computation complexity because the XOR is a very low time-consuming operation. In addition, the self-encryption property of the protocol in [4] is still remained. The home network maintains a long-term secret key K MH = f (ID M ) for his user M by using a one-way function. By extracting the real identity ID M of user M from the pseudonym identity PID M , we can generate the shared key K MH , which is used to encrypt the In the following, we describe the proposed authentication protocol following the order of message exchange, and discuss the security goals which can be achieved during the execution of each protocol message.
Step 1) When a mobile user M enters a new visited network V, M initiates a registration authentication process with V to identify himself to be a legal subscriber of his home network H. M does the following: (1) Generate a secret random ; (2) Compute his long-term secret key
, PID M , and ID H to V.
Step 2) On receiving message 1 from M, V forwards PID M and sends to H for identity authentication.
Step 3) After receiving the message from V, H first decrypts by using K VH . Then H determines whether the timestamp T V is within the reasonable threshold compared with its current time. If it is not valid, H terminates the process. Otherwise, H gets the real identity of mobile user M by computing: 
Step In the above steps, we illustrate the proposed authentication protocol I for secure roaming services. When M is staying in his home network, the authentication protocol for local services is shown in Fig. 2 . Note that the difference between Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is that the authentication protocol for local services ignores the original Messages 2 and 3 in Fig. 1 
Phase II: One-time Session Key Progression
The main function in phase II is to establish and renew a session key between users M and V. In this phase, we introduce a novel mechanism called "One-time session key progression". The mechanism allows mobile M to renew his session key frequently and reduces the risk to use a compromised session key to communicate with V.
Suppose that mobile user M is required to renew his session key K i with V for the i th time, he can obtain the new session key K i+1 according to the steps shown in Fig. 3 . , . Specially, K 1 is set as the authentication key K auth (Phase I), i.e., K 1 = K auth . The pseudonym identity for user M is calculated as , and hence it will vary in each session key negotiation because of the random number .
As shown in Fig. 3 , on receiving the message 1 from M, V can get the original random generated by user M by computing the following equation:
Message 3. M V:
V verifies whether the decrypted random is equal to the original one . If it is true, V decrypts by using session key K i and checks whether the decrypted session key is the same as the session key preserved by V in the previous key negotiation. If it is true, V terminates the execution. Otherwise, the identity of M is authenticated. Subsequently, V does the following: (1) Generate a random ; (2) Set as the next session key and keep it; (3) Send to M.
Since random ( ) can be known only by user M (V), K i plays a role of onetime key. Therefore, the new mechanism is called as "One-time session key progression".
Anonymity and Intractability Analysis
The anonymity of user M is obtained by hash function and the smart card issued by his home network H. M hides his real identity in his pseudonym identity PID M , i.e., . Since only H knows the secret N, nobody except H can recover the real identity ID M by computing
The intractability is achieved by two measures: (1) The in each session key progression is different due to the random ; (2) The session key is one-time-use so that there is no direct relationship between session keys. The random numbers guarantee the freshness of PID and session key in each session.
Attack Analysis
Firstly, we analyze the co-operation attacks in Phase II (Fig. 3) . In Specific, there is domain separation between visited networks. When a user enters a new visited network, he will send a new different temporary identity to the new visited network. Moreover, the session key changes with the variation of the random number and . So even though there is a co-operation between visited networks, a new visited network still cannot know the user's real identity.
Secondly, we consider the impersonate attacks in this protocol. (1) An intruder has no way to impersonate H, since he does not possess the long-term secret key and hence it is impossible for him to generate the responding confirmation to V (in Step 3); (2) V also has no way to impersonate H to cheat user M, since the long-term key is unknown to V and he cannot generate which contains the random chosen by M.
Finally, we study the relaying attacks. In order to illegally obtaining an authentication key, an intruder attempts to impersonate a legal user by replaying the user's exchanged messages. He intercepts the Message 1 (step 1) sent by M and then replays Message 1 to V, where in the original message 1 is self-encryption and can authenticate each other (step 3). Therefore, the proposed protocol is able to resist such replaying attacks.
Protocol II for Secure Roaming Services
The proposed protocol II is based on the self-certified scheme. This scheme combines the advantages of certificated-based and identity-based public key cryptosystems [11] .
Regarding to the security strength of self-certified scheme, Saeednia [9] indicated that forging a valid witness w i for user U i is equivalent to break an instance of RSA cryptosystem.
The key idea of the proposed protocol is to consider home network H as a temporary TTP (Trusted Third Party) for roaming services. When M visits V, both of them initialize a registration procedure with H (V acts as an access agent for M). If M and V successfully register with H, they will obtain a witness from H, respectively, and the trust relations between M and V are established. In the consequent communications, M can directly negotiate the session key with V without accessing H. Similar to the proposed protocol I, this protocol also composes of two execution phases: Phase I) Mutual authentication protocol for registration; Phase II) Session key exchange protocol. The protocol uses public key algorithm and can be applied when visited network and home network do not have pre-setup shared secret.
Phase I: Mutual Authentication Protocol for Registration
User M chooses a random M u r Z ∈ and computes mod (n) as his public key.
Similarly, V also generates a random
∈ and calculates mod (n) as his public key. Next, let and be two strings associated with the personal information (Name, Address, etc.) of users M and V, respectively. In addition, suppose and be the witness of users M and V. Both are issued and calculated by H as follows:
Then the new authentication protocol for roaming services can be described in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 . Authentication Protocol Based on Self-Certified Scheme As shown in Fig. 4 , the shared key K MH are computed as , where the random is generated by M and the public key of H is already delivered to user M through a secure channel in advance. And the real identity ID M of user M is hidden in the temporary identity TID M , which is computed as .
We describe our proposed protocol II as follows. Step 2) V generates a random , computes , and sends , and to H. 
